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Introduction 
Even if households work to age 65 and annuitize all 
their financial assets, including the receipts from 
reverse mortgages on their homes, the National 
Retirement Risk Index (NRRI) has shown that 44 
percent will be ‘at risk.’  ‘At risk’ means they will be 
unable to maintain their standard of living in retire-
ment.  When health care costs were included explic-
itly, the percentage of households ‘at risk’ increased 
to 61 percent.  Our previous analysis of health care 
costs, however, did not consider possible expenses 
for long-term care towards the end of life.  This brief 
explores how the need for long-term care could affect 
the NRRI.
This brief is structured as follows.  The first section 
recaps the original NRRI and the NRRI with health 
care costs explicitly included.  The second section 
describes the nature of long-term care, the likelihood 
of a household member needing such care, and the 
financing alternatives available.  The third section 
explores how the challenge posed by long-term care is 
different for households of different types and wealth 
levels.  The fourth section models the impact of long-
term care on the NRRI.  The final section concludes.
A Recap of the NRRI
Even before the current financial crisis, a changing re-
tirement landscape has been making it more difficult 
to attain income security in old age.1  The need for re-
tirement income is increasing due to rising life expec-
tancy and escalating health care costs.  At the same 
time, retirement income relative to pre-retirement 
earnings is declining.  At any given retirement age, 
Social Security benefits will replace a smaller fraction 
of pre-retirement earnings as the Full Retirement Age 
rises from 65 to 67.  And the balances in 401(k) plans 
were modest even before they were decimated by the 
financial crisis.
To quantify the effects of the deteriorating retire-
ment landscape, the NRRI measures the percent of 
working-age households who are ‘at risk’ of being 
financially unprepared for retirement.  The Index 
calculates for each household in the 2004 Survey of 
Consumer Finances a replacement rate – projected 
retirement income as a percent of pre-retirement 
earnings – and compares that rate with a target rate 
derived from a life-cycle consumption smoothing 
model.  Those who fail to come within 10 percent 
of the target are defined as ‘at risk,’ and the Index 
reports the percent of households ‘at risk.’
By Alicia H. Munnell, Anthony Webb, Francesca Golub-Sass, and Dan Muldoon*one hand, it is hard to blame people for not ramping 
up their savings in response to a systemic problem 
like health care cost inflation.  But, on the other hand, 
soaring health care inflation will cause serious prob-
lems for future retirees if they don’t save enough.
More broadly, the NRRI results are conservative 
estimates in several ways.  First, they assume people 
retire at age 65.  In fact, most people retire earlier, 
which means they receive actuarially reduced Social 
Security benefits, their 401(k) plan has less time to 
grow, and they have to support themselves over a 
greater number of years.  Second, households are 
only required to come within 10 percent of the target 
– not actually hit it.  Third, the estimates assume 
that households annuitize all their financial wealth, 
including the proceeds from a reverse mortgage on 
their home.  In fact, few households annuitize their 
wealth or take out reverse mortgages.  Finally, neither 
version of the NRRI includes any provision for long-
term care expenses.  How the inclusion of long-term 
care might affect the NRRI is explored below.  
The Nature of Long-Term 
Care   
Long-term care is an important expenditure risk for 
the elderly.  People tend to lose some of their abil-
ity to function as they get older, and these losses can 
become severe late in life.  To compensate, older 
people need assistance with basic activities of daily liv-
ing (such as bathing, eating, dressing, and using the 
toilet) and with tasks necessary for independent living 
(such as shopping, cooking and housework).  
Older people with the most serious disabilities 
require nursing home care.  Experts estimate that – at 
some point – about one third of today’s 65-year-olds 
will need to enter a nursing home for at least three 
months (see Table 1).  And some will need nursing 
home care for a prolonged period of time.  Perhaps 
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Figure 1. NRRI, Original and Explicitly 
Including Health Care Costs, 2006
Source: Munnell et al (2008).
The original NRRI was later modified to explicitly 
include health care consumption.  In the original 
formulation, the implicit assumption is that spend-
ing on health care is a substitute for other forms of 
consumption.  This assumption implies that retired 
households can rearrange their basket of consump-
tion – consuming more health care and less of other 
goods – and still maintain their standard of living.2  
An alternative – and probably more realistic – way 
to treat retiree health care expenses is as a “tax” that 
people have to pay in retirement.3  Viewing health 
care from this perspective, the household’s goal be-
comes maintaining its non-health care consumption 
in retirement.     
The results for both the original NRRI and the 
NRRI explicitly including health care are shown in 
Figure 1.  When health care consumption is consid-
ered interchangeable with other consumption, 44 per-
cent of households will be ‘at risk.’  Once health care 
is introduced explicitly into the calculations, the Index 
rises to 61 percent.  That is, 61 percent will be unable 
to maintain their pre-retirement non-health care 
consumption.  An analysis by age group indicates that 





















Original NRRI NRRI including health care expenses
The dramatic increase in the percentage of 
households ‘at risk’ reflects an expectation that health 
care costs will continue to soar in the future.  These 
projections, which are grounded in the analysis of 
the Medicare actuaries, are in line with other recent 
studies of retiree out-of-pocket health costs.4  On the 
Table 1. Probability of Nursing Home Use for 
Individuals Turning 65 in 2010 
Source: Congressional Budget Office (2004) based on data 
from Spillman and Lubitz (2002).
Length of stay
Three months or longer 33
One year or longer 24
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more importantly from the standpoint of financing 
such care, it is difficult to predict who will need it and 
who will not – it could happen to anyone.  In addition 
to nursing home care, many more people will need 
some type of home care services, either delivered by 
professionals or by family or friends.5
Paid long-term care is very expensive.  In 2008, 
the annual cost of a nursing home was about 
$70,000 for a semi-private room and $77,000 for a 
private room.  Alternatively, employing a home health 
aide for four hours a day five days a week would cost 
nearly $20,000 per year.6  According to the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, total expen-
ditures on long term-care for the elderly in 2004 
amounted to $114 billion (see Table 2).  
Private long-term care insurance is a relatively 
recent phenomenon, which has grown slowly but 
steadily over the last 20 years.  Initially, policies cov-
ered only nursing home care, but today three fourths 
of policies cover home care as well.11  Researchers 
have explored reasons for the slow growth of private 
long-term care insurance, because – in theory – an ag-
ing population could be expected to provide a strong 
boost to sales.  On the supply side are the limitations 
in the product and the cost.  For example, the typical 
policy purchased covers only one third of the expected 
present discounted value of long-term care expendi-
tures, since many policies have a daily cap of $100 in 
nominal terms.  Also, the loads are high – amounting 
to about 18 percent of premiums on the typical policy 
purchased at age 65 and held until death.12  Another 
constraint on the supply side may be difficulty in pric-
ing the risk of the policies, which could potentially 
make the product unprofitable for insurers.13  But per-
haps the key factor is on the demand side – namely, 
the existence of Medicaid.  Simulations suggest that 
even if comprehensive private policies were avail-
able at actuarially fair prices, about two thirds of the 
wealth distribution would not buy them because of 
Medicaid.14
The lack of private resources to cover long-term 
care costs is a serious concern – especially for married 
couples.  For those with adequate resources, nursing 
home care means an additional expenditure of up to 
$77,000 per year.  Less than 15 percent of the elderly 
population can withstand such a drain.15  Medicaid 
then becomes the backstop, but at the risk of impov-
erishing the spouse remaining in the community.16
Reliance on Medicaid also limits the type of nurs-
ing home that the recipient receives.  Studies suggest 
that along a variety of dimensions, the quality of nurs-
ing home care for those with the resources to pay – at 
least for a year or two – is far superior to the institu-
tions available to those who enter on Medicaid.17
The question regarding the NRRI is how does 
a one-in-three chance of having to enter a nurs-
ing home for possibly several years, the availability 
of Medicaid, and the complicated situation facing 
couples, affect households’ retirement security.  
Long-Term Care and 
Retirement Security
Looming long-term care costs have different implica-
tions for single and married households and for those 
in different parts of the wealth distribution.  In all cas-
es, however, the options include relying on Medicaid; 
buying long-term care insurance; or planning to sell 
Table 2. Long-Term Care Expenditures for the 
Elderly, by Source of Payment, 2004
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2007).
Payment source
Medicaid 37.6 12.3 32.4
Medicare 17.6 62.6 26.9
Other public 2.7 3.1 2.7
Private insurance 7.9 7.6 7.8
Out of pocket 30.6 12.5 26.8
Other private 3.6 1.9 3.2
Total (percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0





Medicaid pays for a large percentage of total costs 
because the program pays virtually the entire amount 
for nursing home and home health services for those 
who qualify.  To qualify, however, individuals must 
meet very strict income and asset tests, which vary 
by state.  Some states use the federal guidelines to 
qualify for Supplemental Security Income, which 
in 2008 amounted to $637 in countable monthly 
income and $2,000 in countable assets for a single 
person.7  Other states provide services for individuals 
up to 300 percent of the SSI threshold.  Those with 
assets too high to initially qualify for Medicaid can 
enter a nursing home, spend down their assets and 
then be eligible for benefits.8
A sizeable portion of long-term care costs falls on 
individuals.  Recipients and their families pay out-of-
pocket about 30 percent of the cost of nursing homes 
and more than 10 percent of the cost of home care.9  
This percentage is much higher than that for health 
care costs generally, where a much larger share is 




   Married 12.1 16.1
   Single 8.4 10.7
Wealth tercile
   Bottom 4.0 5.0
   Middle 8.2 11.3
   Top 16.7 21.5
the house when long-term care is required.  In the 
case of long-term care insurance, the premiums vary 
with age at time of purchase and the comprehensive-
ness of the product.  But, for discussion purposes, a 
comprehensive product that assumes five percent per 
year inflation cost about $3,500 at age 65 in 2008.18  
Delay is expensive.  The premiums more than double 
to almost $7,300 at age 75.19  These are individual 
policies; the cost for a couple could be twice as much.  
Not surprisingly, as shown in Table 3, the percentage 
of households with such policies is modest.
Household Type
The choices facing a couple are clearly different than 
those of a single individual.  One obvious approach 
for single individuals is to rely on their home equity 
to pay for long-term care or at least enough of long-
term care to gain entry to a non-Medicaid nursing 
home.  In the case of a couple, however, the pos-
sibility exists that each member may need nursing 
home care.  But this potential challenge should not be 
overstated; husbands on average are four years older 
than their wives and men’s life expectancy at 65 is two 
years less than women’s, so the husband will most 
likely die first.20  Possibly because wives who outlive 
their husbands do not have a spouse to provide care 
at home, women are more likely to require nursing 
home care than men.  Indeed, almost 75 percent of 
older nursing home residents are women.21
The Lower Third.  The options for households in 
the lowest third of the wealth distribution are the 
most straightforward.  The non-housing assets for 
this group range from zero to about $22,000, and 
this group relies almost entirely on Social Security 
benefits for support.  For both single individuals and 
married couples, long-term care insurance is likely to 
be unaffordable; indeed, only 5 percent of households 
in the bottom third purchased coverage in 2006.  
Therefore, Medicaid is probably the best option.  
For couples, Medicaid spousal protection rules 
ensure that if one spouse requires long-term care, the 
house and a substantial proportion of the household’s 
financial assets will pass to the surviving spouse.22  
If the institutionalized spouse prefers non-Medicaid 
care, and the house is sufficiently valuable, one option 
is to use the proceeds of a reverse mortgage to gain 
access to such care, before falling back on Medic-
aid.  If the household has not already taken a reverse 
mortgage, the surviving spouse could sell the house 
to obtain access to private care for herself. 
Given the very low incomes of this group, using a 
reverse mortgage to finance general post-retirement 
consumption or purchase home health care, and then 
relying on Medicaid long-term care might be a better, 
if unpalatable, alternative. 
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Table 3. Private Long-Term Care Insurance 
Coverage Rates among the Elderly in the HRS, 
2000 and 2006
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the University of 




Table 4. Median Non-Housing Wealth For Older 
Households by Tercile, 2004
Source: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, Survey of Consumer 
Finances, 2004.
Age
        Tercile
     1             2               3
60+ $5,300 $76,900 $556,660
60-74 $6,820 $89,100 $634,000
75+ $3,800 $56,500 $388,500
Household Wealth
The wealth levels of older households vary consider-
ably, as shown in Table 4.  Households at different 
levels tend to face different options and challenges 
with respect to financing long-term care.  The follow-
ing discussion divides households into three groups 
by wealth.Issue in Brief 5
The Top Third.  The financial wealth of the top third 
of the wealth distribution ranges from $200,000 
upwards.  These households will want higher quality 
care; they will want to protect the community spouse; 
and they may be concerned about leaving a bequest.  
Medicaid is not a realistic option.  They will be re-
quired to pay all or a substantial proportion of their 
nursing home costs out of their own pocket.  
The very wealthy can self-insure by relying on 
their substantial assets.  These households will pur-
chase long-term care insurance only if they wish to 
reduce uncertainty as to the amount of their eventual 
bequest.  But few are so fortunate.  Thus, most house-
holds in this group face two options: 1) buy long-term 
care insurance to offset some of the costs; or 2) self-
insure by conserving housing equity until the end of 
life (for those with fewer financial resources).   
Each strategy has advantages and disadvantages.  
Insurance will dramatically reduce, but not eliminate, 
the uncertainty around long-term care expenses.  
These policies often specify a maximum number of 
years of care, exposing the household to what may be 
a small risk of exceeding that period.  Unanticipated 
increases in the cost of long-term care may result 
in policy benefits that 
are insufficient to cover 
the full cost of care.  And 
sometimes the household 
may be unable to continue 
coverage if the insurer exercises the right contained in 
many policies to increase premiums.  
Relying on the sale of the house to cover long-term 
care expenditures, which seems like an ideal hedge 
since the household’s demand for housing drops to 
zero when the last member enters a nursing home, 
is also a less than perfect solution.  If one spouse is 
institutionalized while the other is alive, the sale of 
the house will require the community spouse to move 
to rented accommodation.  If one spouse wishes to 
continue to live in the house, the most the house can 
yield is the amount obtainable on a reverse mortgage.  
Even if the house is unencumbered and available for 
sale, in some parts of the country the proceeds may 
be insufficient to cover an extended stay in care.
The Middle Third. The middle third of households 
have non-housing assets that range from $22,000 to 
about $200,000.  Many in this group might benefit 
from long-term care insurance.  Insurance could 
ensure them access to a non-Medicaid nursing home, 
prevent them from having to run down their finan-
cial resources plus their home equity, and protect 
their assets for their children.  The hurdle for many 
of these households, however, may be the price.  The 
median income of this middle group is $32,000, so 
paying $3,500 per person per year may seem insur-
mountable.  And, as mentioned above, most in the 
middle group will be discouraged from buying even 
a perfectly designed long-term care policy because of 
the presence of Medicaid.  
None of the costs of long-term care are included 
in the NRRI results presented above.  The following 
section attempts to quantify how the potential for 
long-term care expenditures affects households’ abil-
ity to maintain their pre-retirement non-health-related 
spending.
The NRRI and Long-Term 
Care Expenses
The approach for incorporating long-term care into 
the NRRI varies by wealth group.  For households in 
the bottom third, the assumption is that the prospect 
for long-term care expenditures does not alter their 
behavior.  These 
households plan 
to rely on Medicaid.  
As a result, they 
continue to take out 
a reverse mortgage 
on their home, annuitize that withdrawal, and use 
the proceeds to support their general consumption 
during retirement.  Thus, the NRRI for the bottom 
third of households is unaffected by the prospect of 
long-term care.
For the remaining two thirds of the wealth dis-
tribution, the analysis considers the impact of two 
alternative strategies: 1) purchasing long-term care 
insurance, and 2) refraining from taking a reverse 
mortgage so that housing equity is potentially avail-
able to fund long-term care.  According to the life-
cycle model of savings behavior, a household that 
anticipates using part of its post-retirement income 
to purchase long-term care insurance or earmarking 
housing equity for long-term care will plan for lower 
consumption both before and after retirement than 
otherwise similar households.  In the NRRI frame-
work, this option means changing the target replace-
ment rates for the top two thirds to take account of 
each of the above strategies and then calculating the 
percent of households ‘at risk’ of failing to meet the 
revised targets.
Paying for long-term care has no 
“one-size-fits-all” solution.Center for Retirement Research 6
Purchasing Long-Term Care Insurance
In order to calculate the effect of purchasing long-
term care insurance on the NRRI, it is necessary to 
calculate new target replacement rates that enable 
households to smooth their consumption (excluding 
out-of-pocket spending for health care and long-term 
care insurance) over their lifetime.  This calculation 
first requires removing out-of-pocket health care 
spending both before and after retirement and the 
cost of long-term care insurance after retirement.23  
We have assumed annual premiums for long-term 
care insurance of $3,500 for a comprehensive policy 
and calculated the value of an annuity needed to 
cover all premiums payable in retirement.24  We then 
subtract this annuity amount from lifetime resources, 
and recalculate target replacement rates.  These 
targets  are lower than in the base-case NRRI because 
two major expenditure items have been excluded.  
The next step is to add to these targets the amount 
necessary to cover retiree health care expenses and 
long-term care expenses in retirement.  The income 
required to cover the costs of health care and long-
term care insurance is then added to the numerator of 
the target replacement rates to derive the new targets.   
An example might help.  In the original NRRI, 
the target replacement rate for a two-earner couple 
in the middle third of the income distribution was 
76 percent.  When that same couple smoothes its 
non-health care consumption, the target replacement 
rate initially drops to 70 percent.25  When the couple 
smoothes its consumption excluding health care and 
the cost of long-term care insurance, the target drops 
to 68 percent.  Adding the income required to cover 
incremental retiree health care expenses and to cover 
long-term care insurance then raises the combined 
target to 98 percent.26  (See the Appendix for further 
details.)  
To determine the percent ‘at risk’ involves compar-
ing projected replacement rates for each household 
with the relevant target replacement rate including 
health care and long-term care insurance.  As in the 
original NRRI analysis, those households that do not 
come within 10 percent of their target replacement 
rate are classified as ‘at risk.’  The results of this 
comparison are shown in Figure 2.  Overall, explicitly 
including health care raises the percent of households 
‘at risk’ – that is, not capable of maintaining their pre-
Figure 2. NRRI, Original, Explicitly Including 
Health Care Costs, and Explicitly Including 




























retirement standard of non-health care consumption 
– from 44 percent to 61 percent.  Including the cost 
of long-term care insurance raises the number to 64 
percent.  Because the costs of long-term care insur-
ance and other health costs are rising and the income 
system is contracting, a much larger percent of later 
cohorts will be ‘at risk’ than earlier ones. 
 
Preserving Home Equity for Long-Term 
Care 
The alternative strategy is to preserve home equity to 
cover the costs of long-term care.  Within the context 
of the NRRI, this exercise requires two adjustments.  
First, the targets need to be changed to reflect the fact 
that the household will have fewer lifetime resources 
– because of not accessing home equity through a 
reverse mortgage – to devote to non-health consump-
tion.  Second, the annuitized proceeds from the 
reverse mortgage need to be deleted from retirement 
income.  The results of this two-stage process are that 
65 percent of households are ‘at risk,’ as shown in 










































Original NRRI NRRI including long-term care insurance
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NRRI including long-term health care insurance
NRRI including health care expensesIssue in Brief 7
Conclusion
The potential need to cover large long-term care ex-
penses in retirement poses a significant challenge for 
households.  The chance of needing nursing home 
care is only one-third, but the cost of such care is very 
high.  The situation varies based on a household’s 
wealth level.  For those in the bottom third of the 
wealth distribution, the most reasonable strategy is to 
rely on Medicaid.  Those in the top third may be able 
to self-insure, but more likely they will need to either 
purchase long-term care insurance or rely on tapping 
their housing equity to pay for long-term care.  Those 
in the middle third might benefit from long-term care 
insurance, but may find the price tag too steep, sug-
gesting that they will plan to fall back on Medicaid if 
their assets are exhausted.
As with the earlier NRRI analysis of general 
retiree health care costs, explicitly incorporating 
long-term care costs into the NRRI raises the bar for 
retirement security by increasing the target replace-
ment rates.  The result is a progressive increase in 
the percentage of households ‘at risk’ from 44 percent 
in the original NRRI base case to 61 percent with the 
explicit recognition of general health costs to about 65 
percent with long-term care costs.  As with past NRRI 
analyses, these latest findings raise major concerns 
about the retirement security of baby boomers and 
succeeding generations. 
Figure 3. NRRI, Original, Explicitly Including 
Health Care Costs, and Using Home Equity to 




































































Original NRRI NRRI including long-term care insurance
NRRI without reverse mortgages
NRRI including health care expenses
Xers
(1965-1974)APPENDIXIncorporating Long-Term 
Care Insurance into the NRRI
In the NRRI, target replacement rates are the replace-
ment rates which households need in retirement to 
maintain the same standard of living they enjoyed in 
their working years.  This appendix explains how the 
target replacement rates change under two scenarios: 
1) when households purchase long-term care insur-
ance; and 2) when, instead, households preserve their 
home equity to cover potential long-term care costs.
Previous NRRI Targets
The original NRRI targets are based on a simplified 
life-cycle model in which households smooth their 
wage-indexed consumption across their lifetime.  
This means that households’ real consumption rises 
during their working life in line with general in-
creases in living standards measured by wage growth.  
This makes the targets consistent with the observed 
replacement rates from the Survey of Consumer 
Finances – which use a wage-indexed measure in the 
denominator.  The original NRRI included earnings 
from employment, returns on investments, taxes, the 
purchase of a home with the aid of a mortgage, Social 
Security and defined benefit pension income.  House-
holds were assumed to save and borrow throughout 
their lives and the model used the current structure of 
federal, state and Social Security taxes.
In 2008, an update to the NRRI explicitly in-
corporated health care expenditures.  This exercise 
requires calculating new target replacement rates that 
allow households to smooth their non-out-of-pocket 
health care consumption over their lifetime.  For this 
procedure, it is necessary to account for out-of-pocket 
health care spending both before and after retirement.
Figure A1 shows how both health care and long-
term care expenditures affect the target replacement 
rates.  The first two panels show, for a two-earner 
household in the middle of the income distribution, 
the original NRRI target replacement rate and that 
which incorporates out-of-pocket health expenditures 
(excluding long-term care insurance).  The original 
replacement rate is 76 percent.  After factoring in 
expected out-of-pocket health care expenditures, the 
non-health care component of the target falls to 70 
percent as the household is expected to lower its 
non-health care consumption throughout its entire 
life.  However the addition of the amount necessary to 
cover health care expenditures in retirement increases 
the target replacement rate to 92 percent.
Incorporating Long-Term Care Insurance
Procedurally, calculating the effect of long-term care 
insurance on the NRRI is identical to calculating the 
effect of out-of-pocket health care spending.  It is 
necessary to calculate new targets that allow house-
holds to smooth their non-health care consumption 
throughout their lifetime, taking into account expecta-
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Figure A1. Effect of Long-Term Care Insurance on Target Replacement Rate for Medium-Income 
Two-Earner Couples Born 1960-1962
Note: In accordance with the baseline assumption used in the NRRI, the couples in this example retire at age 65, between 






























Retirementtions of out-of-pocket health care expenditures and 
long-term care insurance.  The result can be shown 
in two steps which are depicted in the right panel 
of Figure A1.  First, the addition of long-term care 
insurance to health expenditures in retirement leads 
to a further reduction in non-health care consump-
tion (moving the non-health care component of the 
target from 70 to 68 percent).  Second, after adding 
the expected cost of long-term care insurance and 
out-of-pocket health care spending in retirement, the 
target replacement rate jumps to 98 percent, which is 
higher than both the original NRRI (76 percent) and 
the basic health NRRI (92 percent).
Preserving Home Equity for Long-Term 
Care 
Calculating the effect on the NRRI of preserving 
home equity for long-term care is similar to the previ-
ous exercises of incorporating out-of-pocket health 
care spending and long-term care insurance.  Since 
households must preserve home equity, they no 
longer take out a reverse mortgage, which will lower 
their consumption both before and after retirement.  
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Therefore, it is necessary to calculate new targets 
that allow households to smooth their consumption 
throughout their lifetime accounting for no reverse 
mortgage and for out-of-pocket health care expendi-
tures.  The result of this exercise can be shown in two 
steps, which are depicted in the right panel of Figure 
A2.  
First, removing the proceeds from a reverse 
mortgage leads a household to reduce its non-health 
consumption (moving the non-health care component 
of the target from 70 to 66 percent).  Second, after 
accounting for this loss of retirement income, in addi-
tion to out-of-pocket health care spending in retire-
ment, the target replacement rate rises to 88 percent.  
This new target, while higher than the original NRRI 
target of 76 percent, is lower than the basic health tar-
get of 92 percent and the long-term care target of 98 
percent.  Despite having such different target rates, 
the percent of households ‘at risk’ in this scenario and 
in the long-term care insurance scenario are quite 
similar.  The reason is that in the current scenario in 
which home equity is preserved, the proceeds from 
a reverse mortgage are not available.  So while the 
target is lower, there is less money available to the 
household to meet that target.
Figure A2. Effect of Preserving Home Equity on Target Replacement Rate for Medium-Income 
Two-Earner Couples Born 1960-1962
Note: In accordance with the baseline assumption used in the NRRI, the couples in this example retire at age 65, between 




























1  For more detail on the changing retirement land-
scape, see Center for Retirement Research at Boston 
College (2006).  
2  The original NRRI assumes that households pur-
chase a single consumption good that includes both 
health and non-health care elements and that the 
marginal utility of consumption does not vary with 
age.  The approach taken by this brief assumes that 
households smooth non-health care consumption 
instead of total consumption.  For a more detailed 
analysis of this technique see endnote 4 in Munnell et 
al. (2008).
3  This brief treats out-of-pocket medical expenses as 
exogenous — medical expenses are required each 
year at the average level — similar to Kotlikoff (1988); 
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995); and Palumbo 
(1999).  In fact, an important portion of the out-of-
pocket expenses at retirement is derived from Medi-
care premiums, which can be considered exogenous 
to a particular household.  A breakdown of the out-of-
pocket medical expenses highlights the importance of 
exogenous Medicare premiums: medical expenses of 
a household that spends only half of the copayments 
and other expenses are about 70 percent of those of 
a household that spends the average copayments and 
other expenses.
4  Fidelity Investments (2007); and Fronstin, Salis-
bury, and VanDerhei (2008).
5  For example, in 2005, about 1.3 million older 
Americans received paid care in their community.  
Another 5 to 6 million seniors in the community 
received unpaid care from family or friends (Johnson 
and Uccello 2005).
6  Metlife Mature Market Institute (2008).
7  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(2008).
8  Medicare is an important provider of skilled home 
health services for the elderly, but covers only tempo-
rary stays in nursing homes that follow hospitaliza-
tions.
9  This discussion ignores the substantial amount of 
informal care donated by family and friends.  
10  Brown and Finkelstein (2007).
11  Brown and Finkelstein (2007).
12  Brown and Finkelstein (2007).
13  McQueen (2008).
14  Brown and Finkelstein (2008).
15  Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System (2004).
16  Under Medicaid, the community spouse can 
retain only half of the couple’s non-housing assets 
at the time the spouse enters a nursing home, up to 
a federally specified maximum ($104,400 in 2008, 
adjusted annually for inflation) or the state standard, 
whichever is greater (Centers for Medicare and Medic-
aid Services 2008).  In terms of income, the com-
munity spouse can keep only one-half of the couple’s 
income.  In many instances, very little of the income 
will be in the wife’s name.  Thus, if the husband en-
ters the nursing home, the wife will be left with little 
income. 
17  Weissert and Scanlon (1985) find that receiving 
Medicaid support significantly increases the probabil-
ity of having an unfavorable discharge status (such 
as death or another nursing home).  Also see Norton 
(2000) for a comprehensive survey of quality of care 
models.
18  Long Term Care Partners (2008).  The premiums 
used in the analysis are based on the Federal Long 
Term Care Insurance Program, which is designed for 
Federal employees.  These premiums are representa-
tive of what can be found in the private market.  On 
the one hand, however, the federal program provides 
slightly better value; on the other, they do not provide 
a spousal discount as do private companies.  Also, in-
surance companies have limited rights to change the 
annual premiums (Brown and Finkelstein 2007).
19  Long Term Care Partners (2008).  Even a five-
percent rider does not provide full protection, because 
long-term care costs may increase even more rapidly.  
20  U.S. Social Security Administration (2008).
21  National Center for Health Statistics (2008).
Issue in Brief 1122  The institutionalized spouse can also transfer 
some of his income back to the community spouse so 
long as the community spouse’s income is below the 
Minimum Monthly Maintenance Needs Allowance, 
which in January 2008 varied between $1,711 and 
$2,610 depending on the state (Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services 2008).
23  In order to explicitly add medical spending to the 
NRRI — which is based on replacement rates — this 
calculation assumes level health care expenditure dur-
ing retirement.  In reality, out-of-pocket health care 
costs are likely to rise with age after retirement, and 
with proximity to death.  The effect on the present 
value of medical costs is ambiguous.  If most costs 
are incurred at advanced ages, it reduces their present 
value.  But the household may wish to set aside ad-
ditional funds to take advantage of the improvements 
in medical technology that may have occurred by the 
time major medical care is required.
24  See endnote 18.
25  As in the original NRRI, the amount of income to 
maintain level consumption includes money to cover 
taxes.
26  Because health care costs are rising so rapidly, tar-
gets that consider health care explicitly vary by cohort.  
The above number refers to a couple born between 
1960 and 1962.
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